1-A. INTRODUCTION
Comes Petitioner Daniel Cobble to file this PETITION with 3 AFFIDAVITS and 9 Attachments, for relief from coercion leading to a wrongful indictment, jailing, and then an unlawful trial and conviction in Case 3:08cr-120-S, in Louisville, Kentucky. Cobble is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 24, ’09, that may involve even more false imprisonment. Though the trial is not relevant to the core issues of Cobble being denied access to our Constitution, there is ample prima facie evidence that the jury was stacked to ensure the conviction (pg. 10), to deepen this complex cover-up that began with Case 3:06cr-93-R.
By law, the Court must recognize any of the enumerated allegations in the attached Affidavit Supporting the Petition and Affidavit of Negative Averments to be true and correct upon NO RESPONSE or NO FACTUAL RESPONSE from the Respondents. At that point, Cobble’s relief must be granted as an administrative matter of due process of law (see Jurisdiction & Venue on pg. 26). – Cobble’s Affidavit of Lien confirms his legally binding lien upon the United States (see ATTACHMENT #9).
Respondents Charles R. Simpson, III, Dave Whalin and Michael A. Bennett aggressively sought the conviction in 3:08cr-120-S to cover-up: 1) Cobble’s legitimate, uncontested, perfected Tort Claim #1571637103 w\ lawful lien (Case 3:08cv-123-T), 2) other injuries of Cobble and other citizens who are being denied access to the law, and 3) issues of our nation’s national security brought before Simpson (in Case 3:08cv-516-S). Simpson is the presiding judge of 3:08cr-120-S. Bennett, an Assist. U.S. Attorney, conspired with Simpson and Whalin (a magistrate judge) to ensure false imprisonment and that Cobble is convicted.
Bennett and Whalin are feasors (offenders) in said Tort Claim #1571637103. #1571637103 regards the other May 26, ’06 false imprisonment and then Mar. 7, ‘07 fraudulent conviction of Cobble (in 3:06cr-93-R). Feasors Bennett and Whalin have already admitted to this same fraud in 3:06cr-93-R, but Simpson has ignored these findings-of-fact and conflicts-of-interest, refusing to address this matter properly as a civil case.
In fact, the very same issues of 3:06cr-93-R are in 3:08cr-120-S: a fraudulent indictment, false imprisonment, and the court’s false claims of jurisdiction. However, this time, Cobble was denied a preliminary hearing, to once again prevent his evidence from reaching the grand jury, as in 3:06cr-93-R.
Complaints and letters have been sent to the FBI about this matter, but w\ no response. The latest complaint was sent to Louisville’s Special Agent In-charge Timothy Cox on Aug. 11, ’09. Respondent Eric Holder, the U.S. Attorneys General, also refused to respond. Holder
was contacted on Mar. 25 and April 28, ’09 by verifiable mail. In addition, the FBI’s Public Corruption Unit was contacted in Washington, and Louisville, also on April 28, ‘09.
The above mentioned governmental officials are aware of Cobble’s Tort Claim #1571637103 and the United States’ (U.S.) obligation to pay that claim. Tort Claim #1571637103 is attached to lien 2008-2298237-43.01 (filed with Kentucky Sec. of State), of which the U.S. is obligated to honor that lien. The claim cannot be legally dismissed by the courts, as attempted by Judges Amul R. Thapar and Thomas C. Wheeler (pg. 12).
As is very typical with the Louisville courts, Simpson, Whalin and Bennett ignored the due process of Cobble Oct. 20, ’08 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Case 3:08cv-566 (Filing fee paid Nov. 5, ’08, Receipt #L33016574).
Please see other facts of 3:08cr-120-S:
1. A meager warning of our national security: On Oct. 16, ’08, out of desperation, Cobble conducted an “act of civil self-defense” to warn the community \ nation of the national security emergency of the impending financial \ economic crisis. At the 10\16\08 initial hearing, Cobble read into the court record his 3-page statement (DN 14) re: case 3:08cv-516-S, that his specific purpose was for national security, and that there were no other way to get the particular issues before the public and a grand jury due to court corruption. His filed statement also stated that he would pay for any damages that ensued from the act. Under the color of law, Simpson was seeking to dismiss, and then he issued his Nov. 21, ‘08 order (DN 16) to dismiss national security case 3:08cv-516-S, while Cobble was jailed under false imprisonment. That 11\21\08 order colors the law by falsely stating that the federal court does not have jurisdiction; but whereas, it is only the federal court that can preside over matters of antitrust and negligence by federal agencies.
2. Ioos gives false account to Grand Jury for indictment: Respondent U.S. Deputy Marshal Kirk Ioos falsely reported in his 10\16\08 complaint that Cobble did the act to “get the court’s attention. . . ,” for Ioos to justify “probable cause.” On Oct. 22, ’08, Ioos told this same falsehood to the Grand Jury to secure an indictment for Bennett and Whalin.
See Pages 4 and 5 of the grand jury transcripts as ATTACHMENT #1. However, transcripts \ audio recording of the 10\16\08 hearing clearly shows that Cobble was compelled and specified his presence in the name of national security, per his 3-page statement, supra. There is no probable cause, since Cobble did the act for our national security and identifying persistent governmental malfeasance. Thus, Cobble was without criminal willfulness or maliciousness, as Ioos otherwise stated to the Grand Jury (see Page 5 of transcripts as ATTACHMENT #1).
On 10\22\08, when questioned by the Grand Jury, Ioos and Whalin neglected to tell them about Cobble’s uncontested, perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, of which Bennett and Whalin are feasors. Besides the obvious conflicts-of-interest, here, Bennett and Whalin have “legally admitted” in that claim that the federal court is without jurisdiction of the federal courthouse, and that the indictment in 3:06cr-93-R (the courthouse tarring case) was fabricated. At the 10\22\08 grand jury proceedings, supra, Ioos lead-on the Grand Jurors to falsely believed the indictment in 3:06cr-93-R was valid. The Grand Jury was not aware that Bennett, Jim Lesousky, David L. Huber and Whalin have admitted to fabricating indictment 3:06cr-93-R. In 3:06cr-93-R, too, Cobble was absent criminal willfulness or maliciousness, because he brought with him various cases showing that governmental officials were violating the law. That is why they did not take Cobble’s evidence to the 2006 Grand Jury. Since there was no evidence of probable cause, they fabricated the indictment (see Page 5 of ATTACHMENT #1).
3. The fraudulent conviction [of 3:06cr-93-R]: The conviction of 3:06cr-93-R is provably fraudulent by its identification of Cobble as the Defense Counsel, abet pro se, but whereas Cobble did not attend that trial’s proceedings. See the 3:06cr-93-R conviction as ATTACHMENT #2, where Cobble is identified as Defense Counsel. On that day of trial, Mar. 7, ’07, after Thomas B. Russell (presiding judge), Lesousky and Bennett acquiesced in “legal admission” to Cobble’s LEGAL CHALLENGES, that the indictment was fabricated, and that the court lacked jurisdiction, Cobble vacated the trial proceedings in citing that his presence was not warranted. From their admissions, Cobble then reported to Russell that he would not participate in the proceedings. Russell then allowed Cobble to vacate the proceedings prior to commencement of trial. – Also, when Cobble requested an Art. III judge, Russell falsely claimed that he was an Art. III judge.
To issue the invalid conviction, Judge Russell was compelled to place Cobble’s name as Defense Counsel, since due to their “legal admissions” to Cobble’s challenges, it was illegal for Russell to replace Cobble with another attorney. Yet, Russell did exactly that. He replaced Cobble with Attorneys Scot C. Cox and Michael R. Mazzoli for the kangaroo trial for a public show, but in recording the conviction he reported Cobble as Defense Counsel (again, see ATTACHMENT #2), to avoid implicating Cox and Mazzoli. – Then, subsequently, the court clerk reported to the Veterans Administration in Louisville and in the Kentucky State Police‘s rap-sheet on Cobble, that Cobble was not convicted.
4. Simpson wrongfully teaches federal jurisdiction: At the 10\16\08 initial hearing, Cobble informed Respondent Whalin, the Magistrate Judge, that the federal court lacked jurisdiction of the federal courthouse in-question. Whalin ignored this jurisdictional challenge and jailed Cobble. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Louisville federal courthouse has not been ceded by the Kentucky legislature for federal jurisdiction. In Cobble’s Aug. 6, ’09 motion for reconsideration (DN 88), he proved to Simpson that Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 3.010 specifies that the “. . . acquisition of land shall not be deemed to result in a cession of jurisdiction by this Commonwealth.” (Emphasis added.) Here, KRS 3.010 clearly distinguishes that the mere acquisition of land is not a cession of jurisdiction.
In fact, Simpson is misleading the public by falsely teaching that the federal government has inherent jurisdiction over all federal lands that it acquires. On Page 9 of his Aug. 20, ’09 instructions to the jurors, Simpson so states:
“The term ‘special territorial jurisdiction of the United States’ includes any lands
reserved for use by the United States government.” (See Page 9 of the jury instructions as ATTACHMENT #3.)
But besides the instructions of KRS 3.010 (and KRS 3.020), Article I § 8 Clause 17 of our U.S. Constitution instructs that any land within the states acquired by the federal government must have the particular state’s legislative approval for any “cession” of jurisdiction. Clause 17 is also known as the Federal Enclave Clause. – Hence, Simpson is dangerously teaching wrongful public policy, where the federal government is claiming jurisdiction where that it does not have, power that is constitutionally and inherently intended for the states, the people. As alluded above, Simpson’s Aug. 17, ’09 order (DN 98) ignored Cobble’s discussion on KRS 3.010’s distinction between acquisition and the federal government’s requirement for cession of jurisdiction, supra (DN 88).
5. Conspiracy to deny a preliminary hearing: [Magistrate] Whalin declared at the 10\16\08 initial hearing and by his respective Nov. 17, ’08 order (DN 5) that Cobble would receive a preliminary hearing on Oct. 20. He then violated that declaration by refusing Cobble a preliminary hearing at the 10\20\08 hearing. He declared again a preliminary hearing for Oct. 28, ’08. Whalin’s 10\20\08 second declaration for a 10\28\08 preliminary hearing is stated in his Oct. 22, ’08 order (DN 8).
However, Cobble did not receive a preliminary hearing on 10\28\08, but instead Cobble was lynched with arraignment for an indictment. The denied preliminary hearing prevented Cobble from entering his evidence into the record for the Grand Jury. That evidence identified a valid national security situation and the cases of other citizens being systematically denied access to the law.
EQUALLY IMPORTANT, here, is that Whalin and Bennett acted with intent to conspire to: 1) deny Cobble a preliminary hearing, 2) bar him from the Grand Jury, and 3) keep him falsely imprisoned. This is proven by Whalin’s Oct. 22, ’08 order for a preliminary hearing (DN 8) being entered on the same day that the grand jury convened. He sought to indict Cobble while posturing for a preliminary hearing, but where a preliminary hearing would not be held on 10\28\08 since the grand jury had already convened on 10\22\08. (In 3:06cr-93-R, Cobble was given a preliminary hearing, as he did enter his evidentiary files into the record for the grand jury; Whalin and Bennett have admitted by their acquiescence in Cobble’s tort claim that a grand jury proceeding was not held; again, because they did not want to show Cobble’s evidence. His evidence precluded probable cause.)
Thus, the same as 3:06cr-93-R, supra, Cobble’s 10\16\08 evidence in 3:08cr-120-S demonstrated that his presence at the courthouse was not criminally willful or malicious. So, here, too, that same evidence would have barred an indictment by the grand jury.
6. Conspiracy for Cobble’s false imprisonment: With jurisdiction ignored, the preliminary hearing was denied so that Cobble’s evidence could not be entered for the Grand Jury. Thus the conspiracy for a fraudulent indictment ensued, as Cobble was sent to jail for seven months, until May 11, ‘09. In fact, on Oct. 20, ’08 Cobble submitted his written “Request to the Grand Jury to Testify” (DN 13) and his 3-page Statement to the Grand Jury (DN 14), but these submissions were unlawfully converted into “motions” by Judge John G. Heyburn (DN 16), and then denied by Whalin (DN 25). Yet, these were direct communications to- and intended only for the Grand Jury, but court officials denied Cobble’s right to communicate to the Grand Jury.
Cobble’s jail time, acute harassment and metal duress, were extensive, because Bennett’s Nov. 12, ’08 motion (DN 32) for Cobble to undergo a psychiatric examination was granted by Simpson. This is even though Cobble had already undergone two previous court ordered psychological evaluations, specifying his high level of competency and that he does not suffer from mental illness. Also, these court officers are familiar with Cobble’s proficient litigation.
7. Cobble is denied an Article III court: Cobble demanded a Constitutional Article III court at the defunct Oct. 28, ’08 arraignment, supra. Since that request went unanswered, on Mar. 2, ’09, Cobble filed a Judicial Notice (DN 55) for an Art. III court. Cobble again mentioned the Art. III problem in his May 11, ’09 Evidentiary Letter (DN 66), filed in the court by notice. Finally, Simpson asserted in his July 21, ’09 order (DN 84) that he is an Art. III judge, but he does not state the specifications of an Art. III court or how it differs from an Art. IV court. Cobble has asserted that U.S. district courts are territorial, administrative courts under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, not judicial courts under Art. III. Cobble’s arguments also include that Simpson cannot have the simultaneous jurisdictions\ mandates of an Art. III court an Art. IV court. At trial, Simpson also stated to the jurors, in open court, that his court is a territorial court, an Art. IV court. With that declaration of being territorial, his court cannot be an Art. III judicial court.
So, on Aug. 6, ’09, Cobble filed a motion for reconsideration (DN 88), of Simpson’s 7\21\09 order, supra, requesting of Simpson to state the technical differences between an Art. III and Art. IV court. That 8\6\09 motion also requested of Simpson’s to provide his credentials as an Art. III judge, but Simpson has refused to provide credentials. Subsequently, at the pre-trial conference, and in Simpson’s respective Aug. 14, ’09 order (DN 97) Cobble’s 8\6\09 motion was denied, even though Simpson has not proven himself to be an Art. III judge. Therefore, the law must presume that Simpson is not an Art. III judge.
8. A rush to trial w\ NO discovery & NO witnesses ALLOWED after Cobble encountered more fraud and cover-up: For sure, the trial was unlawful for the reasons stated above:
1) There was no probable cause to indict, since Cobble provably acted for our
national security, due to persistent governmental malfeasance,
2) Cobble was denied due process of law (and jailed) to cover-up his true reasons
for the 10\16\08 act,
3) The court lacks jurisdiction,
4) Cobble was denied an Article III court,
5) The minor injury upon the courthouse is offset by the larger injuries that
Government is inflicting upon Cobble.
The trial depicts the exacerbated behavior of Louisville court \ governmental officials, of which Cobble and others have long suffered and provided evidence, thereof.
Early-on while jailed, Cobble objected with his pleadings to Whalin’s illegal rulings, including, of course, the issue of jurisdiction. But as usual, his pleadings went unanswered by the court and Bennett. But when Cobble was finally released on May 11, ’09, during his long-awaited detention hearing, Simpson instructed that the question of jurisdiction would be answered. While the parties waited through May, June and July (’09), Cobble received a hint that Simpson would wrongfully uphold jurisdiction. That hint was when Simpson instructed Whalin to assign Cobble a stand-by attorney. Then on July 21, Simpson issued orders upholding the entirety of Whalin’s prior orders on jurisdiction and the indictment. But he did not rule on Cobble being denied a preliminary hearing. On June 25, ’09, Cobble had ordered transcripts
of the 5\11\09 hearing. The court reporter provided the transcripts, but these transcripts did not reflect exactly what transpired at the hearings. So, Cobble ordered the audio recording of the 5\11\09 detention hearing, but on July 27 the court falsely reported that the recording could not be given to Cobble. On July 29, Cobble responded to the court reporter that if the recording was not given, that he’d have no choice but to report the matter to the FBI. In retaliation, on July 31, Cobble then received orders from Simpson (DN 85) that a pre-trial conference would be held on Aug. 12, and a trial would commence on Aug. 18, ’09. By Aug. 11, Cobble filed a complaint with the FBI (DN 94), c/o Special Agent In-charge Cox, identifying the fraud and obstruction of justice of the 5\11\09 transcripts, refusal to supply the public audio recording of that hearing, and other violations in this case. But again, the FBI would not respond to Cobble’s complaint.
The 8\11\09 Complaint to the Cox also reported of how the U.S. district court is refusing to honor Cobble’s legitimate tort claim and lien, supra, (see ATTACHMENTS 8 & 9).
With only 18 days to trial, at the 8\12\09 pre-trial conference (affirmed by Aug. 14, ’09 order, DN 96), Simpson denied Cobble’s motion for extension-of-time (to ninety days, DN 86) to prepare for trial, and he denied all witnesses pursuant to Cobble’s Aug. 12, ‘09 notice to subpoena witnesses (DN 93). These witnesses experienced the same denials of due process as Cobble, as many of the files at the 10\16\08 courthouse scene belong to these witnesses. At that conference, Simpson also stated that Cobble could not depose or subpoena any governmental witnesses that have injured him. Cobble was effectively denied discovery and defense for trial.
9. Cobble was further denied a defense at unlawful trial: To further ensure that Cobble would be given a guilty verdict by the jury: 1) Simpson would not allow the jurors to view direct evidence, the documents that were recovered from the alleged crime scene (the courthouse). 2) Simpson would not allow Cobble’s direct evidence to be entered into the trial record, the documents that were recovered from the alleged crime scene (the courthouse). 3) Simpson refused to allow Cobble’s Exhibits A thru H and J thru P into the trial record, and thus, the jury were not allowed to see these evidentiary Exhibits.
10. Prima facie evidence of a stacked jury: Even when Cobble proved to the jurors that Simpson and Bennett were violating the law, and thus that the court must then rely on the lawful presumption of innocence of Cobble, the jury still ignored these violations of court
officials to issue a guilty verdict. In fact, Cobble’s closing statement identified for the jurors at
least 7 violations of Simpson and Bennett. – Whereby, the juror’s persistent disregard for the law indicates that some jurors were planted by court officers to ensure a guilty verdict. TO WIT:
A) Cobble was coerced into participating in the trial.
B) At the opening and closing statements, Cobble informed the jury that the trial proceedings were illegal.
C) On Aug. 19, ’09, directly after the jurors were dismissed for the day, Simpson informed Bennett and Cobble at the sidebar that he would not give the jurors instructions on the affirmative defense of “justification.” Yet, Cobble discussed justification as a point of law in his opening and closing statements. MOREOVER, since Cobble stated that he did the act, justification was a logical as well as lawful defense. The question-of-law for “justification” is Why was Cobble at the courthouse scene?
D) Cobble proved to the jurors that Ioos gave a false statement to justify the initial criminal complaint. He falsely stated “Cobble said he did it to get the court’s attention.”
E) Cobble proved to the jurors that Ioos and Bennett refused to investigate violations of law reported in the files at the courthouse scene.
F) The jurors witnessed Simpson’s false statement that “he would allow Cobble to have an audio recording of a hearing.” But Cobble showed the jurors how Simpson had previously ruled to deny Cobble the audio recordings.
G) The jurors witnessed Simpson’s refusal to allow them to examine Cobble’s direct evidence from the courthouse scene.
H) The jurors witnessed Simpson’s refusal to enter Cobble’s direct evidence into the trial record.
I) Cobble proved to the jurors that he was denied case-discovery.
F) Cobble proved to the jurors that this is a civil case.
K) Cobble proved to the jurors that Bennett had not proven \ shown willful criminal intent or malicious behavior.
L) Simpson refused to allow Cobble to make a closing rebuttal statement to Bennett’s closing rebuttal statement.
A valid jury that is properly instructed in law could not give a guilty verdict in this case.
11. Eric Holder & Cox did nothing to stop Simpson, et. al: Respondents Eric Holder and Timothy Cox are wantonly negligent by refusing to protect Cobble, refusing to stop Simpson, Bennett, and Whalin from these outright violations of law. They include, from above, various obstructions-of-justice, exacerbated harassment, mental duress, tampering w\
court records, denial of rights under the color-of-law, complicity w\ crimes being committed, intent to deny due process of law, violations of the 1st and 14th Amendments, and conspiracy.
See the April 25, ’09 letter to Respondent Holder as ATTACHMENT #4 (w\ Certificate of-mailing). See the April 28, ’09 to Holder as ATTACHMENT #5 (by Certified mail 7008 1140 0002 9423). Holder was informed of Cobble’s false imprisonment by Bennett and the court’s lack-of-jurisdiction. But Holder allowed these violations to continue.
See the April 28, ’09 Complaint to the FBI’s Public Corruption Unit (PCU) as ATTACHMENT #6 (by Certified Mail 7008 1140 0002 1901). The PCU ignored that Cobble was held under false imprisonment.
See the Page-1 of Cobble’s Aug. 11, ’09 Complaint of Wrongful Prosecution to Respondent Cox w\ the certified mail receipts as ATTACHMENT #7 (DN 94). It is a 6-page Complaint and 12 EXHIBITS. Cobble identifies fraud, tampering w\ court records, obstruction-of-justice, denial of due process, and color-of-law violations, committed by Simpson, Bennett and Whalin. The Complaint also identifies how the federal courts are ignoring Cobble’s uncontested, perfected Tort Claim #1571637103. Yet, Cox refused to respond to these allegations. Copy of the Complaint is filed by Aug. 11, ‘09 Notice in 3:08cr-120-S (DN 94).
12. Refusal to Ratify Cobble’s Perfected Tort Claim w\ Lien: Cobble’s Tort Claim is not only perfected with a valid \ lawful lien, but, too, when it was filed in U.S. district court for ratification (on Feb. 26, ’08, Case 3:08cv-123-T), Defendant United States proper, did not even show-up for court. Copy of the lien is provided in Cobble’s Aug. 11, ’09 Complaint to the FBI (again, copy of that Complaint was filed by Notice in court on 8\11\09, DN 94.) Wherefore, the United States is in full admission and favor of the claim, and thus, as an administrative matter the district court is required to ratify the claim for payment pursuant to local, state, and federal laws \ statutes, as well as recognition of its findings-of-fact of 3:06cr-93-R. Federal statutes include the Federal Tort Claims Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 5, § 2671, § 2674, and § 2679(b) and (d).
Simpson’s Aug. 13, ’09 order states (DN 97) that the tort claim was denied by the United States. But a refusal to pay a claim does not negate its validity. It simply means that a court is required to ratify a perfected claim (under local, state and federal law) to compel payment by the United States.
This matter was formally brought to Simpson’s attention in Cobble’s July 7, ’09 Motion to Remove Court Officers Due to Material Conflicts-of-interest (DN 78). When Bennett’s July 20, ’09 Response stated that Cobble had not provided any proof of the claim (DN 79), Cobble’s Aug. 6, ’09 Reply provided copy of the 13-page perfected claim (DN 89) and May 14, ‘07 proof- of-service to Bennett and Whalin. The Reply also included the Sept. 17, ‘09 Notice of Default of 3:08cv-123-R (DN 46), the no-show \ no contest in court of United States proper.
On or about Mar. 13, ’09, Amul R. Thapar, the federal judge presiding over 3:08cv-123-T, unlawfully transferred Tort Claim #1571637103 to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (USCoFC) in Washington, D.C. in yet another attempt to deny the claim.
But 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) so clearly specifies:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution . . . . or for liquidated or un-liquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. (Emphasis added.)
Tort Claim #1571637103 sounds in tort for personal injuries inflicted upon Cobble by U.S. officials. Wherefore, Thapar wrongfully transferred Cobble’s claim to USCoFC, because he knew that USCoFC would attempt to dismiss the claim. True enough, on Aug. 24, ’09, Thomas C. Wheeler, the judge at USCoFC, issued an order to dismiss Tort Claim #1571637103 out of hand (Case 09- 379C). But to the contrary, the proper jurisdiction for tort claims is U.S. district courts under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Tort Claim #1571637103 is attached to lien 2008-2298237-43.01 (filed with Kentucky Sec. of State), of which the U.S. is obligated to honor that lien. The claim cannot be legally dismissed by a court.
The U.S. district court and United States are required by law to recognize Cobble’s claim. However, to wrongfully prosecute Cobble, Simpson has refused to recognize Cobble’s valid claim, as well as its findings-of-fact that relate to 3:08cr-120-S. Simpson has unlawfully allowed Bennett’s and Whalin’s conflicts-of-interest for further injury of Cobble. See Cobble’s perfected claim as ATTACHMENT #8. See Cobble’s Affidavit conffirming his lien against U.S. Dept. of Treasury as ATTACHMENT #9.
COUNTS (43)
• Fraudulent Conviction in 3:06cr-93-R Pg. 14 • Conflicts of Interest Ignored Pg. 14
• Article III Court Denied Pg. 15 • Simpson Ignored Petition for Habeas Corpus Pg. 15
• Grand Jury is Deceived w\ Intent to Commit Conspiracy Pg. 16 • Lack of Jurisdiction Pg. 19
• Preliminary Hearing Denied Pg. 20 • Tampering w\ Court Records Pg. 21
• Trial Discovery Denied Pg. 22 • Law Enforcement Notified Pg. 2
• Refusal to Ratify Legitimate Tort Claim Pg. 23 • More Violations at Illegal Trial Pg. 2
• Fraudulent Conviction in
3:06cr-93-R
COUNT 1
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Conspiracy
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
Simpson, Bennett, and Whalin are well aware that Case 3:06cr-93-R is a fraudulent conviction with the same issues of law as fraudulent 3:08cr-120-S, yet they are still pursuing Case 3:08cr-120-S to prosecute Cobble.
• Conflicts of Interest Ignored
COUNT 2
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Conspiracy
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
Charles R. Simpson, III (Simpson) ignored the conflicts-of-interest that exists for Dave Whalin (Whalin) and Michael A. Bennett (Bennett), he allowed them to continue to injure Cobble while knowing that Whalin and Bennett are feasors in Tort Claim #1571637103 and thus they have an interest in seeing Cobble wrongfully convicted.
COUNT 3
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Conspiracy
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
On Aug. 6, ’09, Cobble filed a Reply (DN 89) for his July 7, ’09 motion to remove Whalin and Bennett from this case due to material conflicts-of-interest, but Simpson ignored ATTACHMENT #6 in said 8\6\09 Reply, that is Cobble’s fraudulent conviction of 3:06cr-93-R, that falsely show Cobble as Defense Counsel at trial, for Cobble was not present at trial, as trial judge Russell allowed Cobble to vacate the trial proceedings of 3:06cr-93-R after Cobble challenged the indictment and jurisdiction.
• Article III Court Denied
COUNT 4
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
At the Oct. 28, ’08 arraignment, Cobble requested an Article III Court, and Whalin responded at that arraignment that he would pass-on Cobble’s Request to the trial judge, but the matter of an Art. III Court was not adjudicated until Simpson’s July 21, ’09 order (DN 84).
COUNT 5
Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
Simpson claims to be an Article III judge, but he refuses to provide the credentials of an Art. III mandate as requested in Cobble’s Aug. 6, ’09 motion-for-reconsideration, a matter of public record. And he refuses to distinguish the differences between and Art. III court and an Art. IV court, and thus Simpson is not shown to be an Art. III judge.
• Simpson Ignored Petition for
Habeas Corpus
COUNT 6
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office
• Fraud • Complicity • Wanton Negligence
Simpson and Bennett neglected to respectively adjudicate and prosecute Cobble’s Oct. 20, ’08 petition for writ of habeas corpus, Case 3:08cv-566-S, where all the respondents, Bennett, the U.S. Marshals, and Jailer, Mike Simpson acquiesced in “legal admission” of Cobble being falsely imprisoned, even after Cobble filed his Dec. 3, ’08 Notice-of-default (DN 8).
• Grand Jury is Deceived w\
Intent to Commit Conspiracy
COUNT 7
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Wanton Negligence
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Complicity • Conspiracy
On Oct. 16, 08, at the initial hearing, Cobble reported to Whalin, Bennett, and Deputy U.S. Marshal Kirk Ioos of approx. 24 cases Cobble had in his possession at the courthouse scene of various violations of law by governmental officials, yet Whalin, Bennett, and Ioos neglected to report or investigate these cases.
COUNT 8
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Complicity • Conspiracy
Whalin and Bennett acted with intent and conspired to: 1) deny Cobble a preliminary hearing, 2) bar him from the Grand Jury, and 3) keep him falsely imprisoned; Whalin’s Oct. 22, ’08 order for a preliminary hearing (DN 8) was entered on the same day that the grand jury convened; whereby, Whalin and Bennett sought to indict Cobble while simultaneously having a preliminary hearing scheduled, but where a preliminary hearing would not be held on the scheduled 10\28\08 for the presentment of evidence to the grand jury, since the grand jury had already convened on 10\22\08.
COUNT 9
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
On or about Nov. 3, ’08, under the color-of-law by their respective pleading and order (DNs 23 & 25), Bennett and Whalin blocked both of Cobble’s Oct. 20, 08 evidentiary requests to the grand jury (DN 25), including Cobble’s Request to testify Before the Grand Jury (DN 13) and Cobble’s 3-page Statement to the Grand Jury (DN 14), as Cobble has a right to communicate to the grand jury. Cobble’s requests \ communications were unlawfully converted to motions so that Whalin could deny them (DN 16).
COUNT 10
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
On Oct. 22, ’08, to secure an indictment, Ioos falsified his statement to the Grand Jury
by stating that Cobble did the act at the courthouse to “get the court’s attention.” But to the contrary, Cobble read into the court record on Oct. 16, ’08 his filed 3-page statement in stating that he did the act as a matter of national security and that governmental officials were conducting a silent policy to deny people access to the courts, and that Cobble was trying to bring this matter before the public and a grand jury. And Ioos neglected to inform the Grand Jury of Cobble’s issues of national security and governmental malfeasance. Wherefore, Cobble was without criminal willfulness and maliciousness of which Ioos told the grand jury.
COUNT 11
Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
On Oct. 22, ’08, to secure an unlawful indictment, the Grand Jury was also deceived when Ioos and Whalin neglected to tell the Grand Jury that 3:06cr-93-R is a fraudulent conviction, where Cobble is falsely specified as the Defense Counsel at trial, but where Cobble did not attend the defunct trial on the basis of his proper challenges to jurisdiction and the indictment; as the 10\22\08 Grand Jury questioned Ioos about 3:06cr-93-R, the courthourse tarring case (see the fraudulent conviction as ATTACHMENT #2).
COUNT 12
Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
On or about Oct. 22, ’08, Whalin and Bennett received a poisoned indictment from the Gand Jury, where Ioos, Whalin and Bennett neglected to inform the Grand Jury that Cobble’s jurisdictional challenge was pending at the time of the 10\22\08 Grand Jury proceedings.
COUNT 13
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Conpsiracy
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office
• Fraud • Conspiracy • Cover-up
On Oct. 22, ’08, to secure an indictment, the Grand Jury was also deceived when Ioos and Whalin neglected to tell the Grand Jury about Cobble’s legitimate, uncontested, perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, of which Bennett and Whalin are feasors. Both are aware that the issues of 3:06cr-93-R are the same as 3:08cr-120-S, that are the court’s lack of jurisdiction, fraudulent indictment, and false imprisonment.
COUNT 14
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Fraud
• Denying rights under the color of law
• Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office
On Oct. 22, ’08, to secure an indictment, the Grand Jury was also deceived when Ioos and Whalin neglected to tell the Grand Jury that 3:06cr-93-R is a fraudulent conviction, where Cobble is falsely specified as the Counsel for Defense at trial, but where Cobble did not attend the defunct trial on the basis of proper jurisdictional challenges.
COUNT 15
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has acquiesced in “legal admission” that officials repeatedly denied Cobble due process of law, and yet those same issues of law exists in the instant case where Bennett is denying Cobble due process. These issues are the court’s lack of jurisdiction, fraudulent indictment, false imprisonment, and other denial of due process.
COUNT 16
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Conspiracy
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
On or about Dec. 10, ’08, Simpson granted Bennett’s motion for Cobble to undergo a third court-ordered psychiatric examination, that kept Cobble under false incarceration (DN 38).
COUNT 17
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Cover-up
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett and Whalin have acquiesced in “legal admission” that they and James R. Lesousky issued a fraudulent indictment on Cobble, and yet that same issue of law exists in 3:08cr-120-S where Bennett and Whalin have acted to indict Cobble w/ a fraudulent indictment.
• Lack of Jurisdiction
COUNT 18
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
• False Imprisonment • Cover-up
On Oct. 16, ’08 Whalin and Bennett incarcerated Cobble under false imprisonment on the false premise that the court has jurisdiction. KRS 3.010 and 3.020 specify regarding “all lands” that federal courthouses in Kentucky are not under jurisdiction of the federal government, since KRS 3.010 instructs that the mere acquisition of federal land is not the same as having jurisdiction.
COUNT 19
• Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Violations of Oath-of-Office
Simpson’s July 21, ’09 order (DN 84) falsely upheld Whalin’s Nov. 3, ’08 order (DN 25) that specifies the court having jurisdiction, but whereas in accordance with KRS 3.010, the Kentucky legislature has not granted federal jurisdiction of the courthouse in Louisville. KRS 3.010 instructs that, in “all lands,” the mere acquisition of land is not the same as having the cession of jurisdiction.
COUNT 20
• Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Violations of Oath-of-Office
Article I § 8 Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution instructs that any land within the states acquired by the federal government must have the particular state’s legislative approval for any “cession” of jurisdiction. Yet Simpson has ignored this Constitutional requirement.
COUNT 21
• Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
Violations of Oath-of-Office
In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has “legally admitted” by his acquiescence that the United States does not have jurisdiction over the federal courthouse in Louisville, yet by prosecuting 3:08cr-120-S, Bennett now contradicts himself by specifying that the United States does have jurisdiction.
• Preliminary Hearing Denied
COUNT 22
•Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Conspiracy
• Denying rights under the color of law
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office
On Oct. 20, ’08, Whalin and Bennett denied Cobble the due process of a preliminary hearing, but as otherwise ordered a preliminary hearing by Whalin at the Oct. 16, ‘08 initial hearing for continuance on Oct. 20, ’08, and by written order on Oct. 17, ’08 (DN 5), and thus they blocked Cobble from submitting evidence to the grand jury.
COUNT 23
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Conspiracy
On Oct. 28, ’08, Whalin once again denied Cobble the due process of a preliminary hearing, though Whalin otherwise ordered a preliminary hearing at the Oct. 20, ‘08 hearing for Oct. 28, ’08, and by written order on Oct. 22, ’08 (DN 8), and thus he blocked Cobble from submitting evidence to the grand jury.
COUNT 24
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
Simpson does not deny that Cobble was denied a preliminary hearing, and yet Simpson proceeded with this case.
• Tampering w\ Court Records
COUNT 25
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Tampering w\ Court Records
On or about July 22, ’09, Simpson’s court issued to Cobble fraudulent transcripts of the May 11, ’09 detention hearing that did not reflect the actual occurrences of that hearing.
COUNT 26
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Conspiracy
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress • Tampering w\ Court Records
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
On or about July 27 and Aug. 14, ‘09, the Simpson informed Cobble that he would not provide audio recordings of the May 11, ’09 detention hearing.
• Trial Discovery Denied
COUNT 27
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
At the Aug. 12, ’09 pre-trial conference, Simpson and Bennett denied trial discovery for Cobble, even though Simpson only recently issued his order on jurisdiction on July 21, ’09 (DN 84) and the question of jurisdiction has been opened since Cobble’s Nov. 10, ’08 objection (DN 31), as that question was reaffirmed by Simpson at the May 11, ’09 detention hearing, i.e., the case was placed on-hold for the question of jurisdiction, and then Simpson took Cobble to trial on Aug. 18, ‘09 without discovery, only 6 days after the pre-trial conference.
COUNT 28
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity
At the Aug. 12, ’09 pre-trial conference, Simpson denied Cobble due process of law by refusing to allow witnesses for Cobble at trial; these “willing” witnesses are relevant for their experiences of also being denied access to the law for sustained injuries, the same as Cobble. Cobble brought many of their case-files to the courthouse scene on Oct. 16, ‘08
COUNT 29
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud • Complicity • Cover-up
At the Aug. 12, ’09 pre-trial conference, Simpson denied Cobble due process of law by refusing to allow hostile witnesses to be available at trial; these witnesses are relevant for their refusal to allow Cobble access to the law.
• Law Enforcement Notified
COUNT 30
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Wanton Negligence
• Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
Timothy Cox, Special Agent In-charge of the FBI in Louisville, Kentucky was informed about the various unlawful behaviors of Whalin, Bennett and Simpson in Cobble’s Aug. 11, ’09 Complaint (Certified mail - 7008 1140 0002 1026 1029), but Cox has refused to take action against these officials. Cobble contacted the FBI’s Public Corruption Unit in Louisville on April 28, ’09 by verifiable mail (Certified mail - 7008 1140 0002 9423 1901), but it, too, has not responded. Cox and the FBI have allowed these continuing injuries of Cobble.
COUNT 31
• Denial of due process • Mental Duress • Wanton Negligence
• Violation of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
Eric Holder, the U.S. Attorneys General, was informed about the unlawful behavior of Bennett and Simpson in Cobble’s Mar. 25, ’09 and April 28, ’09 letters (Certified mail - 7008 1140 0002 1026 1029), but Holder has refused to take action against these officials. Holder has allowed these continuing injuries of Cobble.
• Refusal to Ratify Legitimate Tort Claim
COUNT 32
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Mental Duress
• Violation of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
Amul R. Thapar, a U.S. District Judge in Owensboro, Kentucky, has refused to ratify Cobble’s tort claim. On or about Mar. 13, ’09, Thapar illegally transferred Cobble claim to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, in attempts to have it summarily dismissed.
COUNT 33
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Mental Duress
• Violation of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
Thomas C. Wheeler, a judge of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, issued an order on Aug. 24, ’09 to unlawfully dismiss Tort Claim #1571637103. Wheeler accepted the claim while already being informed by Cobble, i.e. letters to Court Clerk Buckley on June 16 and July 13, ’09, that tort claims belong in U.S. district courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) and the Federal Tort Claims Act. Whereby, Wheeler willfully acted deny Cobble due process of law.
COUNT 34
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Mental Duress
• Violation of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
Thapar, Wheeler and Simpson, have ignored Cobble’s valid lien (see ATTACHMENT #9) of Tort Claim #1571637103, that is binding upon the United States.
• Violations at Illegal Trial
COUNT 35
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress • Conspiracy
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
Cobble was coerced into the illegal Aug. 18, ’09 trial.
COUNT 36
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress • Conspiracy
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
At the opening and closing statements of defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, Cobble informed the jurors that the trial proceedings were illegal.
COUNT 37
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress • Conspiracy
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
At the defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, Simpson would not allow Cobble’s direct evidence from the courthouse scene to be examined by the jurors.
COUNT 38
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress • Conspiracy
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
At the defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, Simpson and Bennett would not allow Cobble’s direct evidence from the courthouse scene to be entered into the trial record.
COUNT 39
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress • Conspiracy
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
At the defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, Simpson would not allow Cobble’s EXHIBITS A thru H and J thru P into the trial record.
COUNT 40
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Fraud
• Denying rights under the color of law
• Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office
At the defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, Simpson would not stop the trial when Cobble proved to the jurors that Ioos and Bennett refused to investigate violations of law reported by the files at the courthouse scene.
COUNT 41
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process
• Denying rights under the color of law
• Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office
• Fraud • Conspiracy • Cover-up
At the defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, the jurors witnessed Simpson’s false statement that “he would allow Cobble to have audio recording of a hearing,” as Simpson had previously ruled that Cobble may not have audio recordings, access to the public record.
COUNT 42
Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Denying rights under the color of law
Mental Duress • Violations of Oath-of-Office • Complicity
At the defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, Cobble proved to the jurors that Bennett had not proven \ shown willful criminal intent or malicious behavior, since Cobble did the courthouse act for our national security and had identified governmental malfeasance.
COUNT 43
• Obstruction of Justice • Denial of due process • Complicity
• Denying rights under the color of law • Mental Duress
• Violations of Oath-of-Office • Fraud
At the defunct trial of 3:08cr-120-S, Simpson refused to allow Cobble to make a closing rebuttal statement to Bennett’s closing rebuttal statement.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
Cobble demands an Article III court for this matter, and trial by jury. However, the Louisville U.S. district court also has jurisdiction as an administrative matter, i.e. upon the attached affidavits being true and factual the district court is required to rule in favor of Petitioner without judicial proceedings. The enumerated allegations herein including the three Affidavits must stand as true and correct in the courts if not rebutted by in fact, law and evidence by the Respondents. The events and occurrences in the above enumerations and Affidavits occurred in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Therefore, this court has administrative jurisdiction in this matter.
RELIEF SOUGHT
1) Vacate the unlawful conviction of 3:08cr-120-S, and expunge 3:08cr-120-S from the public record, and make this a civil matter for addressing the damages,
2) Vacate the unlawful conviction of 3:06cr-93-R, and expunge 3:06cr-93-R from the public record,
3) Ratify the full amount of Cobble’s legitimate, uncontested, perfected Tort Claim #1571637103 (Case 3:08cv-123-T). The full amount is warranted, because governmental officials ignored Cobble’s initial offer in 3:08cv-123-T to settle for a fraction of the injury amount. As usual, these officials continued their shenanigans and exacerbated injuries of Cobble, as described, herein. The claim may be ratified by any judge.
