• Article III Court Denied

4.         At the Oct. 28, ’08 arraignment, Cobble requested an Article III Court in open court, but Simpson did not respond to that request until July 21, ’09 (DN 84).

5.         Simpson claims to be an Article III judge, but he will not provide his credentials of an Article III judge, and he will not distinguish the differences between and Art. III court and an Art. IV territorial court.

• Simpson Ignored Petition for Habeas Corpus

6.            Simpson did not adjudicate Cobble’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Case 3:08cv-566-S, clearly denying Cobble due process of law.

• The Grand Jury is Deceived w\ Intent to Conspire

7.            At the Oct. 16, 08 initial hearing, Cobble reported to Whalin, Bennett, and Deputy U.S. Marshal Kirk Ioos (Ioos) of approx. 24 cases that Cobble had in his possession at the courthouse scene of various violations of law by governmental officials, but Whalin, Bennett, and Ioos did not report or investigate these cases.

8.             Whalin and Bennett did not give Cobble a preliminary hearing, but instead they acted with intent to: 1) deny Cobble a preliminary hearing, 2) bar him from the Grand Jury, and 3) keep him falsely imprisoned.

9.         On or about Nov. 3, ’08, under the color-of-law by their pleading and order (DNs 23 & 25), Bennett and Whalin did not allow Cobble’s Oct. 20, ‘08 evidentiary requests to the grand jury, including Cobble’s Request to Testify Before the Grand Jury (DN 13) and Cobble’s 3-page Statement to the Grand Jury (DN 14).

10.             On Oct. 22, ’08, Ioos did not make factual statements to the Grand Jury regarding the matter of national security and that governmental officials were conducting a silent policy of denying people access to the courts, and that Cobble was trying to bring this matter before the public and a grand jury.

11.         On Oct. 22, ’08, Ioos was not truthful when he mislead the Grand Jury about Cobble’s willful intent, to present and justify that Cobble was criminally willful and malicious.

12.         On Oct. 22, ’08, to secure an indictment, the Grand Jury was also deceived when Ioos and Whalin did not tell the Grand Jury that 3:06cr-93-R is a fraudulent conviction (see the conviction as ATTACHMENT #2).

13.            On or about Oct. 22, ’08, Whalin and Bennett received a poisoned indictment from their false information given to the Gand Jury, but where it is shown that Cobble was not criminally willful or malicious.

• Lack of Jurisdiction

14.         Due to the absence of jurisdiction and no criminal willfulness or maliciousness, this is not a criminal matter for the United States, but this case is a civil matter for damages.

15.            Simpson, Whalin and Bennett are not respecting or following the instructions of KRS 3.010 that instructs that acquisition of federal land is not the same as having jurisdiction.

16.            Simpson does not recognize the law that KRS 3.010 of 1892 was repealed and then re-codified and replaced w\ KRS 3.010 of 1954.

17.         Simpson does not recognize the law that Article I § 8 Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution instructs that any land within the states acquired by the federal government must have the particular state’s legislative approval for any “cession” of jurisdiction.

18.            In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has not denied his “legal admission” that the United States does not have jurisdiction over the federal courthouse in Louisville.

19.         Simpson has not recognized the law that KRS 3.090 so instructs the United States for receiving federal jurisdiction of any land in Kentucky, as given to Simpson in Cobble’s May 21, ’09 Brief (DN 71).

20.            On or about Oct. 22, ’08, Whalin and Bennett received a poisoned indictment from the Gand Jury, where they did not inform the Grand Jury that Cobble had challenged jurisdiction.

21.            On Aug. 20, ’09, on Page 9 of the written instructions to the jury, Simpson was not truthful when teaching that, “The term ‘special territorial jurisdiction of the United States’ includes any lands reserved for use by the United States government . . .” as the mere acquisition of land is not the same as being ceded with jurisdiction.

• Preliminary Hearing Denied

22.         Absent due process of a preliminary hearing, this case is a civil matter for damages.

23.            On Oct. 20, ’08, Whalin did not follow due process of law when he otherwise scheduled a preliminary hearing at the Oct. 16, ‘08 initial hearing for 10\20\08 and by written order on Nov. 17, ’08 (DN 5) and then he denied that hearing.

24.         On Oct. 28, ’08 Whalin did not follow due process of law when he otherwise scheduled a preliminary hearing at the Oct. 20, ‘08 hearing for Oct. 28, ’08, and by written order on Oct. 22, ’08 (DN 8), and then he denied that hearing.

25.            Simpson does not deny that Cobble was denied a preliminary hearing, and yet Simpson proceeded with this case.

26.            In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has not denied that he, Whalin and James R. Lesousky issued a fraudulent indictment on Cobble in 3:06cr-93-R.

• Tampering w\ Court Records

27.         Simpson’s court did not give Cobble accurate transcripts of the May 11, ’09 detention hearing.

28.         On or about July 27 and Aug. 14, ‘09, Simpson‘s court informed Cobble that it would not provide audio recordings of the May 11, ’09 detention hearing.

• Trial Discovery Denied

29.         Simpson and Bennett would not allow Cobble to prepare for trial.

30.         Simpson would not allow specified witnesses of Cobble at trial that are provably relevant to Cobble’s case.

31.         In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett and Whalin have not denied the court’s lack of jurisdiction, involves a fraudulent indictment, and that Cobble was falsely imprisoned, and yet these same issues of law exist in 3:08cr-120-S.

32.            Simpson did not grant Cobble’s motion-for-extension of time to prepare for trial.

33.         Simpson, Bennett, and Whalin have not denied that the conviction of 3:06cr-93-R is fraudulent with the same issues as 3:08cr-120-S, yet Simpson has not dismissed 3:08cr-120-S for a civil matter.

• Law Enforcement is Notified

34.         Timothy Cox has not taken action against the unlawful behaviors of Simpson, Bennett, and Whalin.

35.         Cox’s Public Corruption Unit has not taken action against the unlawful behaviors of Simpson, Bennett, and Whalin.

36.         Eric Holder has not taken action against the unlawful behaviors of Simpson, Bennett, and Whalin.

• Refusal to Ratify Legitimate Tort Claim

37.         Amul R. Thapar has not followed his oath of office to deny ratification of Tort Claim #1571637103, even though United States proper has not shown-up for court in 3:08cv-123-T.

38.         Thomas C. Wheeler has not responded to Cobble’s June 16 and July 13, ’09 letters specifying that tort claims belong in U.S. district courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) and the Federal Tort Claims Act.

38.         Thapar, Wheeler and Simpson have not recognized Cobble’s legitimate lien upon the United States, Lien #2008-2298237-43.01 issued by the Kentucky Secretary of State.

40.         A perfected tort claim is owed to the Secured Party and cannot be lawfully dismissed.

• Violations at Trial

41.             Simpson would not allow Cobble’s direct evidence from the courthouse scene to be examined by the jurors.

42.             Simpson would not allow Cobble’s direct evidence from the courthouse scene to be entered into the trial record.

43.             Simpson expressly did not allow the jurors to consider the defense of “justification,” though Cobble had argued justification and stated that he did the act at the courthouse scene.

44.             Simpson would not stop the trial when Cobble proved to the jurors that Ioos and Bennett refused to investigate the files at the courthouse scene, proving that Cobble was not criminally willful.

45.             Simpson’s did not stop the trial after he made the false statement, in effect, that “he would allow Cobble to have an audio recording of a hearing,” as Simpson had previously ruled that Cobble may not have audio recordings and that these recordings were not part of the official record.

46.             Simpson would not allow case-discovery for Cobble.

47.             Cobble proved to the jurors that this is not a criminal case.

48.             Cobble proved to the jurors that Bennett had not shown willful criminal intent or malicious behavior.

49.             At the trial Simpson did not allow Cobble to make a closing rebuttal statement to Bennett’s second closing statement.