3.            Simpson has ignored the findings-of-fact in Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103 regarding 3:06cr-93-R, where the same issues exist in 3:08cr-120-S.

• Article III Court Denied

4.         At the Oct. 28, ’08 arraignment, Cobble requested an Article III Court, and Whalin responded at that arraignment that he would pass-on Cobble’s Request to the trial judge, but the matter of an Art. III Court was not adjudicated until Simpson’s July 21, ’09 order (DN 84).

5.         Simpson claims to be an Article III judge, but he refuses to provide the credentials of an Article III mandate as requested in Cobble’s Aug. 6, ’09 motion-for-reconsideration, a matter of public record, and he refused to distinguish the differences between and Art. III court and an Art. IV court, and thus Simpson is not shown to be an Art. III judge.

• Petition for Habeas Corpus Ignored

6.            Simpson denied Cobble due process of law when neglecting to adjudicate Cobble’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Case 3:08cv-566-S), where all respondents, Bennett, U.S. Marshals and the jailer, have acquiesced in “legal admission” of Cobble being falsely jailed.

• The Grand Jury is Deceived w\ Intent to Conspire

7.            At the Oct. 16, 08 initial hearing, Cobble reported to Whalin, Bennett, and Deputy U.S. Marshal Kirk Ioos (Ioos) of approx. 24 cases that Cobble had in his possession at the courthouse scene of various violations of law by governmental officials, but Whalin, Bennett, and Ioos neglected to report or investigate these cases.

8.             Whalin and Bennett acted with intent and conspired to: 1) deny Cobble a preliminary hearing, 2) bar him from the Grand Jury, and 3) keep him falsely imprisoned; Whalin’s Oct. 22, ’08 order for a preliminary hearing (DN 8) was entered on the same day that the grand jury convened; whereby, Whalin and Bennett sought to indict Cobble while simultaneously having a preliminary hearing scheduled, but where a preliminary hearing wouldnot be held on the scheduled 10\28\08 for the presentment of evidence to the grand jury, since the grand jury had already convened on 10\22\08.

9.         On or about Nov. 3, ’08, under the color-of-law by their pleading and order (DNs 23 & 25), Bennett and Whalin blocked both of Cobble’s Oct. 20, ‘08 evidentiary requests to the grand jury, including Cobble’s Request to Testify Before the Grand Jury (DN 13) and Cobble’s 3-page Statement to the Grand Jury (DN 14); as Cobble has a right to communicate to the grand jury; Cobble’s requests \ communications were unlawfully converted to motions by Judge Heyburn (DN 16) as Whalin refused to submit these communications to the Grand Jury.

10.             On Oct. 22, ’08, Ioos falsified his statement to the Grand Jury by stating that Cobble did the act at the courthouse to “get the court’s attention;” but to the contrary, Cobble read into the court record on Oct. 16, ’08 his filed his 3-page statement (DN 14) that he did the act as a matter of national security and that governmental officials were conducting a silent policy of denying people access to the courts, and that Cobble was trying to bring this matter before the public and a grand jury; and Ioos neglected to inform the Grand Jury of Cobble’s issues of national security and governmental malfeasance.

11.         On Oct. 22, ’08, Ioos falsified his statement to the Grand Jury by stating that Cobble did the act at the courthouse to “get the court’s attention;” as Ioos mislead the Grand Jury to present and justify that Cobble was criminally willful and malicious.

12.         On Oct. 22, ’08, to secure an unlawful indictment, the Grand Jury was also deceived when Ioos and Whalin neglected to tell the Grand Jury that 3:06cr-93-R is a fraudulent conviction, where Cobble is falsely specified as the Defense Counsel at trial, but where Cobble did not attend the defunct trial on the basis of his proper jurisdictional and grand jury challenges; as the 10\22\08 Grand Jury questioned Ioos about 3:06cr-93-R, the courthourse tarring case on 10\22\08 (see the conviction as ATTACHMENT #2).

13.            On or about Oct. 22, ’08, Whalin and Bennett received a poisoned indictment due to their false information given to the Gand Jury, but where it is shown that Cobble’s intent was not criminally willful or malicious.

14.            On or about Oct. 22, ’08, Whalin and Bennett received a poisoned indictment from the Gand Jury, where Ioos, Whalin and Bennett neglected to inform the Grand Jury that Cobble’s jurisdictional challenge was pending at the time of the 10\22\08 Grand Jury proceedings.

15.            Cobble’s jurisdictional challenge was not answered by Simpson until July 21, ’09.

• Lack of Jurisdiction

16.         Absent jurisdiction and no criminal willfulness and maliciousness, this case is a civil matter for damages for the United States.

17.            On  Oct. 16, ’08 Whalin and Bennett colored the law to incarcerate Cobble under false imprisonment on a false premise that the court has jurisdiction, while KRS 3.010 and 3.020 specify regarding “all lands” that federal courthouses in Kentucky are not under jurisdiction of the federal government, and KRS 3.010 instructs that the mere acquisition of federal land is not the same as having jurisdiction.

18.            KRS 3.010 instructs the the mere acquisition of land is not the same as having ceded jurisdiction, yet Whalin and Bennett still sought to have Cobble incarcerated.

19.            KRS 3.010 of 1892 specifies the acquisition of a land but not having discussed federal jurisdiction; said KRS 3.010 of 1892 was repealed and re-codified in 1954; the updated 1954 KRS 3.010  distinguishes that acquisition is not the same as having jurisdiction

20.         Article I § 8 Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution instructs that any land within the states acquired by the federal government must have the particular state’s legislative approval for any “cession” of jurisdiction.

21.            In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has “legally admitted” by his acquiescence that the United States does not have jurisdiction over the federal courthouse in Louisville, yet by prosecuting 3:08cr-120-S, Bennett now contradicts himself by specifying that the United States does have jurisdiction.

22.         KRS 3. the United States, or any agency thereof, shall request the Commonwealth to cede jurisdiction over 090 so instructs the United States for receiving jurisdiction of any land in Kentucky, that “. . . whenever any area, it shall be the duty of the Governor to transmit such request to the next session of the General Assembly for such action as it may deem proper.”

23.            Simpson’s July 21, ’09 order (DN 84) falsely upheld Whalin’s Nov. 3, ’08 order (DN 25) that specifies the court having jurisdiction, but whereas in accordance with KRS 3.010 and KRS 3.090, the Kentucky legislature has not granted federal jurisdiction of the courthouse in Louisville; KRS 3.010 instructs that in “all lands” the mere acquisition of land is not the same as having the cession of jurisdiction.

24.            On Aug. 20, ’09, on Page 9 of the written instructions to the jury, Simpson falsely specified that, “The term ‘special territorial jurisdiction of the United States’ includes any lands reserved for use by the United States government . . .” as the mere acquisition of land is not the same as being ceded with jurisdiction.

• Preliminary Hearing Denied

25.         This case is absent a preliminary hearing, a denial of due process.

26.            On Oct. 20, ’08, Whalin denied Cobble the due process of a preliminary hearing, though Whalin otherwise scheduled a preliminary hearing at the Oct. 16, ‘08 initial hearing, scheduled for 10\20\08, and by written order on Nov. 17, ’08 (DN 5), and thus the denied preliminary hearing on 10\20\08 prevented Cobble from submitting evidence to the grand jury.

27.            On Oct. 28, ’08, Whalin once again denied Cobble the due process of a preliminary hearing, though Whalin otherwise ordered a preliminary hearing at the Oct. 20, ‘08 hearing, scheduled for 10\28\08, and by written order on Oct. 22, ’08 (DN 8), and thus the denied preliminary hearing on 10\28\08 prevented Cobble from submitting evidence to the grand jury. 

28.            Simpson does not deny that Cobble was denied a preliminary hearing, and yet Simpson proceeded with this case.

29.            In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has acquiesced in “legal admission” that he, Whalin and James R. Lesousky issued a fraudulent indictment on Cobble in 3:06cr-93-R, and yet that same issue of law exists in 3:08cr-120-S where Bennett has acted to indict Cobble w/ a fraudulent indictment.

• Tampering w\ Court Records

30.         On or about July 22, ’09, Simpson’s court issued to Cobble fraudulent transcripts of the May 11, ’09 detention hearing that did not reflect the actual occurrences of that hearing.

31.         On or about July 27 and Aug. 14, ‘09, Simpson‘s court informed Cobble that it would not provide audio recordings of the May 11, ’09 detention hearing, the audio recording a hearing is a matter public record.

• Trial Discovery Denied

32.         At the Aug. 12, ’09 pre-trial conference, Simpson and Bennett denied trial discovery for Cobble, even though Simpson only recently issued his order on jurisdiction on July 21, ’09 (DN 84) and the question of jurisdiction has been opened since Cobble’s Nov. 10, ’08 Objection (DN 31), as that question was reaffirmed by Simpson at the May 11, ’09 detention hearing, i.e, the case was placed on-hold for the question of jurisdiction since the 11\10\08 Objection, and then Simpson took Cobble to trial on Aug. 18, ‘09 without discovery, only 6 days after the pre-trial conference.

33.            At the Aug. 12, ’09 pre-trial conference, Simpson denied Cobble’s motion-for-extension to deny Cobble trial discovery, as Bennett argued to deny that motion, even though Simpson only recently issued his order on jurisdiction on July 21, ’09 (DN 84) and the question of jurisdiction had been opened since Cobble’s Nov. 10, ’08 Objection (DN 31), as that question was reaffirmed by Simpson at the May 11, ’09 detention hearing, i.e., the case has been placed on-hold for the question of jurisdiction since the 11\10\08 Objection, and then Simpson took Cobble to trial without discovery, only 6 days after the pre-trial conference.

34.         Simpson denied Cobble trial discovery, by refusing to allow witnesses for Cobble at trial; these were “willing” witnesses who also had experiences of being denied access to the law, the same as Cobble.

35.            At the Aug. 12, ’09 pre-trial conference, Simpson denied Cobble due process of law by refusing to allow hostile governmental witnesses to be available at trial; these witnesses are relevant for their refusal to allow Cobble access to the law.

36.         In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett and Whalin have acquiesced in “legal admission” that officials repeatedly denied Cobble due process of law, and yet those same issues of law exists in the instant case where Bennett is denying Cobble due process; those violations include the court’s lack of jurisdiction, a fraudulent indictment, and false imprisonment, except that in 3:08cr-120-S Cobble was denied a preliminary hearing.

37.         Simpson, Bennett, and Whalin are well aware that 3:06cr-93-R is a fraudulent conviction with the same issues of law as 3:08cr-120-S, yet they are still pursuing Case 3:08cr-120-S to prosecute Cobble.

• Law Enforcement Notified

38.         Timothy Cox, Special Agent In-charge of the FBI in Louisville, Kentucky, was informed about the various unlawful behaviors of Whalin, Bennett and Simpson in Cobble’s Aug. 11, ’09 Complaint (Certified mail - 7008 1140 0002 1026 1029), but Cox has refused to take action against these officials.

39.         Cobble also contacted Cox’s Public Corruption Unit (PCU) at the FB in Louisville on April 28, ’09 by verifiable mail (Certified mail - 7008 1140 0002 9423 1901), but the PCU, too, have not responded to the various unlawful behavior of Whalin, Bennett and Simpson, as  Cox and the FBI have allowed these continuing injuries of Cobble.

40.         Eric Holder, the U.S. Attorneys General, was informed about the unlawful behavior of Bennett and Simpson in Cobble’s Mar. 25, ’09 and April 28, ’09 letters (by respective Certificate-of-mailing and Certified mail - 7008 1140 0002 1026 1029), but Holder has neglected to take action against these officials.

• Refusal to Ratify Legitimate Tort Claim

41.         Amul R. Thapar refused to ratify Cobble’s tort claim in 3:08cv-123-T, and on or about Mar. 13, ’09 Thapar unlawfully transferred Cobble’s claim to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, as said Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over tort claims.

42.         Thomas C. Wheeler, of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in case 09-379C, issued an unlawful order on Aug. 24, ’09 to dismiss Tort Claim #1571637103; Wheeler accepted Tort Claim #1571637103 while already being informed by Cobble, i.e. letters to Court Clerk Buckley on June 16 and July 13, ’09, that tort claims belong in U.S. district courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) and the Federal Tort Claims Act.

43.         Thapar, Wheeler and Simpson ignored Cobble’s legitimate lien upon the United States, Lien #2008-2298237-43.01 issued by the Kentucky Secretary of State.

44.         A perfected tort claim is owed to the Secured Party and cannot be lawfully dismissed.

• Violations at Trial

45.             Simpson would not allow Cobble’s direct evidence from the courthouse scene to be examined by the jurors.

46.             Simpson would not allow Cobble’s direct evidence from the courthouse scene to be entered into the trial record.

47.             Simpson expressly did not allow the jurors to consider the defense of “justification,” though Cobble had argued justification and stated that he did the act at the courthouse scene.

48.            Simpson would not stop the trial when Cobble proved to the jurors that Ioos and Bennett refused to investigate the files at the courthouse scene.

49.             The jurors witnessed Simpson’s false statement that “he would allow Cobble to have audio recording of a hearing,” that is contrary to Simpson’s previous rulings that Cobble may not have audio recordings, this access to that public record.

50.             Cobble proved to the jurors that he was denied case-discovery, as Simpson took Cobble to trial without discovery.

51.             Cobble proved to the jurors that this case is a civil matter.

52.             Cobble proved to the jurors that Bennett had not proven \ shown willful criminal intent or malicious behavior.

53.             At the trial Simpson refused to allow Cobble to make a closing rebuttal statement to Bennett’s second closing statement.

• Other Admissions

54.            In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has “legally admitted” by his acquiescence that the United States falsely imprisoned Cobble in 3:06cr-93-R, and yet that same issue of law exists in 3:08cr-120-S where Bennett has acted to jail Cobble.

55.            In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Bennett has “legally admitted” by his acquiescence that the United States issued a fraudulent indictment on Cobble in 3:06cr-93-R, and yet that same issue of law exists in 3:08cr-120-S where Bennett has acted to indict Cobble.

56.            In Cobble’s perfected Tort Claim #1571637103, Whalin has “legally admitted” by his acquiescence that the court does not have jurisdiction over the federal courthouse in Louisville in 3:06cr-93-R, and yet in 3:08cr-120-S, Whalin specified that the court does have jurisdiction.